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REHABILITATING JUVENILE SEX
OFFENDERS WITH A LIFE SENTENCE
ADAM DOERINGER*
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE STORY OF J.W.

On February 14, 2000, J.W. pled guilty to two counts of
aggravated sexual assault.1 The events that led to his guilty plea
2
were shocking: J.W. sexually assaulted two seven-year-old boys.
Specifically, he coerced the two boys into acts of oral and anal sex
with each other and with him. 3 As punishment, the court ordered
J.W. to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. 4 J.W. was
5
a twelve-year-old boy when the court sentenced him.
J.W.'s sentence consisted of two parts: a five-year probation
and a lifetime registration as a sex offender. 6 The five-year
probation was a direct result of his juvenile trial, 7 and was the
longest possible sentence allowed under the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act ("Juvenile Act"). 8
The registration, however, was only
indirectly related to his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. 9
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court held that juvenile sex
offenders are subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act
("SORA"').10
There is a clear and substantial difference between a
maximum sentence of five years probation and registration on a
list depicting the offender as a child molester for the rest of his
* J.D., May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. The author thanks his
editors, Amy Keller and Lisa Johnson, for the fun they surely had editing this
comment. The author also thanks Diane Walsh for her inspiration.

1. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 751.
4. Id. at 750.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 753.
8. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-715 (West
2008).
9. Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5)

(West 2008). The Sex Offender Registration Act, not The Juvenile Court Act,
requires delinquent juveniles to register as sex offenders.
A juvenile
adjudicated delinquent for an act, which if committed by an adult would be an
offense that required registration as a sex offender, must also register as a sex
offender. Id.
10. InreJ.W, 787 N.E.2d at 756.
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life, especially when the recipient of the penalty is a child. 1 This
Comment will analyze this disconnect. Part II details the event
that created this disconnect: the federal law that led to individual
state laws that force juveniles to register as sex offenders. Part II
also summarizes why juvenile registration is a problem, and
finally explains how states such as Illinois have amended sex
Part III
offender legislation to deal with juvenile offenders.
analyzes the current condition of sex offender registration law,
particularly in Illinois, how it comprehends offenses by juveniles,
and why it is still deficient. Finally, Part IV proposes to fold sex
offender registration requirements for juveniles in Illinois into the
Juvenile Act.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AS APPLIED TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A.

How a Juvenile Became a Lifelong Sex Registrant

Illinois law, when the juvenile court adjudicated J.W.
delinquent, required a juvenile sex offender such as J.W. to
register for life. 12 While a lifelong registration is no longer
allowable under the current Illinois SORA, both versions of Illinois
law are based on federal law.1 3 Therefore, the analysis of how
J.W. became a lifelong registrant must begin with the federal law.
1.

The Federal Law: Megan's Law

Megan's Law is comprised of four separate federal laws. 14 In
1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program in
an effort to establish a federal registry for sex offenders by15
encouraging states to create laws requiring sex offender
11. Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary of Megan's Law: When the Child Sex
Offender is a Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 116 (2003). Contrary to the
rehabilitative goal of most juvenile justice systems, sex offender registration
does not provide any rehabilitative means to a juvenile and, in fact, treats
juveniles as adults. Id.; see also In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 770 (Kilbride J.,
dissenting) ("Children have lesser levels of maturity and ... their criminal
acts are generally considered less culpable than those of an adult," and as a
result, children should not be labeled as "sexual predators" for life).
12. Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5)
(West 2008).
13. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1996).
14. Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplicationof
Sex-Offender Registrationand Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91
CAL. L. REV. 163, 206 n.1 (2003).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(3) (West 1996). The Act includes definitions for
both sexually. violent offenders and sexually violent predators. A sexually
violent offense is:
[A]ny criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which
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registration. 16 Next, in 1996, Congress amended this Act with
what was then known as Megan's Law, 17 and required states to
That same year,
make the registered information public.' 8
Congress passed the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and
Identification Act in order to create a federal database to hold the
state registration information. 19 Finally, in 2006, Congress passed
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. 20 This Act
broadened the federal definition of "sex offender" to include anyone
convicted of a sex offense, 21 created three separate categories of
sex offenders based on the severity of the crime, 22 and added
categories of information that offenders must register, including
DNA samples. 23 Most importantly, the Adam Walsh Act requires
states to make the information in their registry available to the
24
public through the internet.

is comparable to or which exceeds the range of offenses encompassed by
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse or an offense that has as its
elements engaging in physical contact with another person with intent
to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.
42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (a)(3)(B) (West 1996).
A sexually violent predator is:
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (a)(3)(C) (West 1996).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1996). The Act set aside $100 million of
federal crime-fighting funds for states as an incentive for compliance. Id. A
state does not have to adopt a form of Megan's law, but if it does not, it forfeits
its portion of the crime-fighting funds. Id.; see also Michele L. Earl-Hubbard,
The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation,and Unintended Results Associated With the Scarlet Letter Laws
of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 799 (1996) (noting that this database,
however, was not designated as public information, and was only available to
local law enforcements agencies, in essence, as a first place to look when
sexual offenses occurred).
17. While this specific Act was originally known as Megan's Law, the
cumulative effect of this series of acts also took on the name Megan's Law.
18. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). "An Act to
amend the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to require
the release of relevant information to protect the public from sexually violent
offenders." Id.; see also Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 206 n.1 (noting that the
newly adopted Megan's Law required some form of community notification
mechanism).
19. Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 14072 (West 1996).
20.Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
21. Id. § 111 (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911). Now, the term "sex offender"
is applied to anyone convicted of a sex offense. Id.
This section categorized sex offenders as tier I, II, or III in
22. Id.
increasing order of severity. Id.
23. Adam Walsh Act § 114 (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914).
24. Adam Walsh Act § 118 (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 16918).
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All of these Acts passed with little opposition, and the original
version of Megan's Law and the Pam Lyncher Act were passed
with little debate and a unanimous vote. 25 Quite simply, this was
because of the national outcry following Jesse Timmendequas'
rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka. 26 Megan's fate
was unquestionably tragic, but national interest was piqued not by
Megan's death but by Timmendequas' status as a convicted child
sex offender. 27 Congressional debate centered on how this crime
could have been prevented. 28
A public database identifying
convicted child sex offenders would have alerted the Kankas to
Timmendequas' proximity, and in theory, they could have acted to
29
prevent the tragedy.
2.

The States'Reactionto Megan's Law

By the end of 1996, all fifty states passed some form of a sex
offender database that met the minimum requirements set by
Megan's Law. 30 While each state was free to design its own
registry, all state laws share common elements. 3 1 A state form of
Megan's Law requires offenders to register personal information
such as their name, personal description, address, and place of
employment. 32 Further, the state law would have to provide a
25. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 168.

26. Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Weekly Radio Address
(June 22, 1996), available at http://edition.cnn.com/US/9606/22/clinton.radio/
transcript.html. 'We've all read too many tragic stories about young people
victimized by repeat offenders." Id. In his speech, he further noted how the
Jacob Wetterling Act was not enough to prevent these offenses, impetus for his
signature implementing Megan's Law. Id.
"Megan's law, named after a
seven-year-old girl taken so wrongly at the beginning of her life, will help to
prevent more of these terrible crimes." Id.
27. Maureen S. Hopbell, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the
Protection of ConstitutionalRights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan's
Law, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 331, 336 (2004).
28. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 340 (2001). Simply, if Megan's family
had known that a sex offender lived in near them, they could have acted by
moving away or simply keeping Megan away from the Timmendequa's house,
and Megan Kanka's tragic death may never have occurred. Id.
29. Id.
30. Wind, supra note 11, at 90.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (a)(1).
32. Wind, supra note 11, at 97-98. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann.
150/3(a) (West 2008) (listing the requirements for sex offender classification).
For instance, a sex offender must provide (and update when necessary) a
current photograph, current address, current place of employment, all e-mail
addresses, instant messaging identities, chat room identities, and other
internet communications identities that the sex offender uses or plans to use,
and even license plate numbers for every vehicle registered in the name of the
sex offender.
Id.; see also Illinois Sex Offender Information database,
available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (showing
all information Illinois makes public in regard to registered sex offenders).
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mechanism

for

communicating

this

information

to

the

community. 33 The result, in theory, allowed anyone to discover if
there were sex offenders in their neighborhood and who they
34
were.
While the impetus for Megan's Law (and the various state
forms) was to protect children from adult sex offenders, the laws
also ensnared offenders who were themselves children. 35 The
federal legislation did not require states to include juvenile
offenders, 36 but most states chose to do so. 37 As a result, "the
juvenile sex offender is treated as an adult by the Megan's Laws of
38
most jurisdictions."
3.

Illinois

The old form of registration law in Illinois required a juvenile
to register 39 for either ten years or for life depending upon the
severity 40 of the crime committed. 41 A juvenile, at that time and
33. Wind, supra note 11, at 97.
34. Id. at 93-94.
35. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 164. "In a misguided effort to protect
potential child and adolescent victims from the special crime of sexual assault,
many states require registration and notification for child and adolescent
offenders who have traditionally been viewed as needing special protection
themselves." Id.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (a)(3). "[C]onduct which is criminal only because of
the age of the victim shall not be considered a criminal offense if the
perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger." Id.
37. Wind, supra note 11, at 78.
38. Id.
39. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5) (West 2008). The Illinois SORA
requires that anyone "adjudicated a delinquent" for committing an offense
that would require an adult to register as a sex offender must register as a sex
offender. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court unequivocally held that this
definition brought juveniles within the purview of the Registration Act. In re
J.W, 787 N.E.2d at 757.
40. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/7 (West 2008). The Illinois Sex Offender
Registration Act recognizes two types of offenses, one for general sex offenses
and another for which an offender is labeled a sexual predator. Id. The latter
carries the lifetime penalty. Id. A sex offense is a violation of any of the
following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 11-20.1 (child pornography);
11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography); 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child);
11-9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child); 11-9.2 (custodial sexual misconduct); 119.5 (sexual misconduct with a person with a disability); 11-15.1 (soliciting for a
juvenile prostitute); 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute); 11-17.1
(keeping a place of juvenile prostitution); 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping); 11-19.2
(exploitation of a child); 12-13 (criminal sexual assault); 12-14 (aggravated
criminal sexual assault); 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child);
12-15 (criminal sexual abuse); 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse); 12-33
(ritualized abuse of a child).An attempt to commit any of these offenses also
carries the penalty of registration. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2 (B) (West
2008). A sexual predator is a person convicted for an offense of federal,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister state, or foreign country law that is
substantially equivalent to: 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution);
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now, registers on a separate juvenile registry42 until they turn
seventeen, after which they must register as an adult. 43 Thus, as
a result of being adjudicated delinquent of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, the court ordered J.W., a twelve-year-old boy, to
44
register as a sexual predator for life.
B.
Why Requiring Juveniles to
Register as a Sex Offender is a Problem
While Megan's Law and its state progeny garnered near
unanimous approval from legislatures, the laws have not gone
entirely without legal objection. "Due to hasty passage of many of
these laws, lawmakers did not adequately consider their potential
constitutional implications or policy concerns. ' 45 Constitutional
challenges to Megan's Laws were brought in both state and federal
court shortly after passage. 46 Nonetheless, "it appears, at least for
11-19.1 (juvenile pimping); 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child); 11-20.1 (child
pornography); 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography); 12-13 (criminal sexual
assault); 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault); 12-14.1 (predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child); 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse);
12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child).
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2 (E) (West 2008).
41. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7 (West 2008).
42. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/121(a) (West 2008). In essence, the juvenile
registry shields the juvenile's information from most of the public, only
allowing dissemination of their registry "to any person when that person's
safety may be compromised for some reason related to the juvenile sex
offender." Id.
43. Id.
44. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757. It is important to note that at the time
the Court decided J. W. the Illinois SORA allowed juvenile registrants to stay
on the juvenile registry permanently. Id. at 760. However, the Illinois
legislature since amended the SORA so that a juvenile registrant, including
J.W., must transfer to the adult registry after their seventeenth birthday.
S.B. 1234, 94th GEN. ASSEM. (Ill. 2005).
45. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 16, at 813-14. "Due to hasty passage of many
of these laws, lawmakers did not adequately consider their potential
constitutional implications or policy concerns." Id.; see also Alison G. Turoff,
Throwing Away the Key on Society's Youngest Sex Offenders, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1140-50 (2001) (discussing how applying sex offender
registration laws to juveniles violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
46. Hopbell, supra note 27, at 342. Specifically, Hopbell notes that these
challenges arose mainly as claims of "punishment, privacy and due process."
Id. The punishment claims focus on how registration subjects offenders to
public ridicule, an argument easily dismissed as Megan's Laws are intended to
protect, not punish. Id. at 342-43. Arguments that registration invades
privacy have been dismissed as the information needed to register is "public
record information already exposed to public view." Id. at 343 (quoting
National Conference on Sex Offender Registries, NCJ-168965, April 1998,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ncsor.pdf.) Finally, the due
process argument is that Megan's Law deprive sex offenders of their liberty
without "extensive, trial-like procedures." Id. However, labeling a person as a
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now, that Megan's Law has survived [these] challenges and will
47
continue to remain in effect."
1.

Requiring Juvenile Offenders to Register as Sex Offenders
Violates the TraditionalApproach to Juvenile Justice

Analysis focused more narrowly on how these laws apply to
sex offenders, who are themselves children, reveals policy flaws.
At the heart of this debate is the clash between the goals of
4s
juvenile justice and the goal of sex offender registration laws.
Since Illinois first separated juvenile justice from its criminal
justice system over a century ago, the hallmark of every state's
system has been a focus on rehabilitating juvenile offenders. 49 In
essence, this ideal recognized that tailored attention could reduce
the risk that a juvenile offender would grow into an adult
criminal. 50 Juvenile sentencing, in turn, was utilized as a tool to
foster rehabilitation, 51 and methods such as probation gave courts
52
a way to monitor and direct a juvenile's progress.
Congress' stated purpose for enacting Megan's Law was to
protect children. 53
A public registry allows parents the

criminal or does not infringe on Constitutional rights. Id.; see also Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 380 (N.J. 1995) (noting that plaintiff was a convicted sex
offender who had been released from prison and had lived and worked within
the community for sometime). He claimed that being forced to register as a
sex offender would lead to losing his job. Id. Therefore, he sued for an
injunction seeking protection from New Jersey's form of Megan's Law,
claiming that the law would constitute punishment, invasion of privacy, and
violate his right to due process. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 421.
47. Hopbell, supra note 27, at 353.
48. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 163.
49. Wind, supra note 11, at 82-83. In 1899, Cook County, Illinois
established the first juvenile court system that was separate from the adult
system. Behind this split was the idea that children should not be treated as
criminals but, instead, the state should work to rehabilitate the children from
a downward spiral into a criminal adult life. Id.; see also Lisa McNaughton,
Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2006) (explaining that the juvenile justice

system was created not only "to address the differences between adults and
children" but to rehabilitate juvenile offenders).
50. Wind, supra note 11, at 82-83.
51. John M. Stuart & Amy K.R. Zaske, What Does a "Juvenile
Adjudication" Mean in Minnesota? Some New Answers After a Century of
Change in Juvenile Court, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 919, 922-23 (2006). In

fact, courts adopted different terminology for juvenile courts. Juveniles are not
convicted of crimes, rather, they are adjudicated guilty or delinquent. Id.; see
also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-105(3) (West 2008) (stating that a

delinquent minor is any minor under the age of seventeen who violated or
attempted to violate federal or state law.).
52. Wind, supra note 11, at 84.
53. H.R. REP. No. 104-555, at 3 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
980, 981.
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opportunity to spot dangers to their children and give law
enforcement officials a place to start their search when sex crimes
are committed.5 4 More importantly, Congress claimed that sex
offenders have a high recidivism rate, a claim that supported the
goal of tracking sex offenders.
However, the sex offender
recidivism rate is simply not as high as Congress thought.5 5 In
fact, some believe that there is little evidence that these laws
work, and, more importantly, that registration may in fact make
56
things worse.
Whichever goal is supported, juvenile offenders like J.W. are
punished in a way not comprehended by the rehabilitative
approach to juvenile justice. 57 Protecting children and preventing
sex crimes is an important goal, but should it outweigh the much
longer standing goal of juvenile rehabilitation?
At the very least, rejecting rehabilitation creates new
problems. 58 Juvenile offenses may be the result of a juvenile's
problems at home and not symptomatic of pathology. 59 Further,
Perhaps no type of crime has received more attention in recent years
than crimes against children involving sexual acts and violence. Several
recent tragic cases have focused public attention on this type of crime
and resulted in public demand that government take stronger action
against those who commit these crimes.
Id.
54. Filler, supra note 28, at 340-41. Federal legislators argued that the
access to sex offender information that Megan's law allowed would give
parents a chance to protect their children from potential repeat sex offenders.
Id. at 341. Further, had the law been in place, for instance, Megan Kanka
would not have died. Id.
55. Human Rights Watch, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE
U.S. 25 (2007) available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf.
The report notes that legislators supporting sex offender registration support
their position by citing sex offender registration rates from forty to ninety
percent. Id. However, these numbers are simply unsupported, and, in fact,
eighty-seven percent of sex offenders are first time offenders. Id.; see also
Interview by Neal Conan with Sarah Toffe, Researcher, Human Rights Watch,
on NPR Talk of the Nation, Sept. 18, 2007 (stating that the numbers
legislators use to support the theory that sex offenders are likely recidivists
are not generally supported, and the real numbers are much lower).
56. Interview by Angela Rozas with Sarah Toffe, Researcher, Human
Rights Watch, in Angela Rozas, Sex-Offender Laws Called Ineffective, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 13, 2007, § 1, at 4.
57. See generally Wind, supra note 11, at 82-84 (discussing that the
traditional juvenile justice approach was "driven by the idea that children
should not be treated as criminals").
58. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 163-64.
59. Wind, supra note 11, at 108-09. While Mr. Wind rejects the notion that
there is a prototypical juvenile sex offender, he suggests that a dysfunctional
home-life is often present. Id. Juvenile sex offenders tend to come from
homes where "parents [had] higher degrees of psychiatric disturbances,
alcoholism, and marital tension[.]" Id. Further, many juvenile offenders are
exposed to inappropriate and explicit sexual material such as pornography.
Id.
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sex offenses may be the enactment of experimentation, not a
flawed mind. 60
Despite these considerations, the prevailing
position is that all juvenile sex offenders should be given what is
61
essentially a black mark on their name.
These problems have not gone unnoticed. While courts have
been, at best, reluctant to alter state sex offender laws, some
legislatures have amended their original laws to recognize juvenile
offenders. 62 In a great majority of states, however, juveniles are
63
still treated as adults.
2.

The Current State of Resolution

Over a decade after Megan's Law was created, rehabilitation
is losing. 64 Juvenile justice systems no longer purport to focus
solely on rehabilitation, 65 and in fact allow punishment if it fosters
public protection. 66 This change in methodology certainly allows
punishing juvenile sex offenders by forcing them to register, like
adults, as sex offenders. 67 Moreover, it creates a hook for courts to

60. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 185-86. Ms. Garfinkle notes that juveniles
do not necessarily recognize the line between normal sexual behavior and
what adults consider criminal sexual behavior. Id. In other words, what may
be criminal to an adult mind may only be a juvenile's attempt to understand
boundaries. Id. "Childhood sex play is not psychologically harmful under
ordinary circumstances and is probably a valuable psychosocial experience in
developmental terms." Id. at 186 (citing William H. Masters et. al., HUMAN
SEXUALITY 217 (5th ed. 1995)).
61. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 204-05. Juvenile and adult sex offenders
ought to be treated differently.
Nonetheless, Congress and most state
legislatures do not treat juvenile sex offenders differently than adult sex
offenders, and "[i]n doing so, they are arbitrarily forcing thousands of children
to face an utterly false lifetime classification as dangerous perverts." Id.
62. See, e.g., S.B. 1509, 95th GEN. ASSEM., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (recognizing
that different treatment of juvenile offenders is necessary).
63. Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 205.
64. Wind, supra note 11, at 84-85.
65. Id. at 84; see also Kulmeet S. Galhotra, Survey of Illinois Law: Juvenile
Delinquency-Protecting the Public, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 847, 848 (2004)
(discussing how Illinois redirected its juvenile justice system policy to focus on
punishment because the old purely rehabilitative method did not treat violent
offenders severely enough).
66. In re J. W., 787 N.E.2d at 758-59. The court recognizes that the former
singular goal of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was rehabilitation. However,
the legislature amended the Act in order to promote public protection as
another goal of the juvenile justice system. As such, the court held that it had
to balance public protection with rehabilitation. Id.; see also Wind, supra note
11, at 84 (beginning in the 1970's, courts began to shy away from
rehabilitation and began to favor punishment as a sentencing guideline).
Many believed that, as protecting the public from dangerous juveniles grew to
the primary concern of lawmakers, that rehabilitation was simply to weak a
method to deter juvenile crime. Id.
67. In re J. W., 787 N.E.2d at 758-59.
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latch on to in upholding such laws. 68 The judicial debate over
rehabilitation and punishment, at least in the area of juvenile sex
offenders, is over; sole responsibility for change rests in the hands
69
of state legislatures.
3. Illinois
Illinois is no different. Following the federal adoption of
Megan's Law, Illinois adopted its own registration law. 70 Until
recently, a juvenile convicted of a sexual offense in Illinois faced a
penalty of registering as a sex offender for at least ten years and
up to lifetime registration. 71
Further, the Registration Act
requires anyone "adjudicated a juvenile delinquent" for
committing an offense that would require an adult to register as a
sex offender to register as a sex offender. 72 The Illinois Supreme
73
Court supports this view.
74
However, on June 1, 2008, Illinois adopted a new approach.
A juvenile may not be considered a sexual predator and be given a
lifetime registration; the maximum time a juvenile will be subject
to registration is ten years. 75 Further, after five years, a juvenile
76
may petition the court to terminate the registration.
Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois Mary
Ann G. McMorrow aptly summarized the landscape of juvenile sex
offenses in Illinois. While she agreed that the current form of the
law in Illinois forced her to rule against J.W., she "invite[ed] the
legislature to reconsider the wisdom of imposing such a burden on
68. Id. at 759.

"This court has recognized that the amendments to the

purpose and policy section of the Juvenile Court Act represent a fundamental
shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns
of protecting the public and of holding juveniles accountable for violations of
the law." Id.
69. Hopbell, supra note 27, at 352.
70. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1-150/12 (West 2008).
71. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/7 (West 2008).
72. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15012(A)(5) (West 2008).
73. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757.
74. S.B. 1509, 95th GEN. ASSEM., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007).
75. Id. While section h of the senate bill expressly limited a juvenile's
registration to ten years, the newly amended text of the statute does not
contain a limiting provision. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3-5 (West 2008).
76. Id.
Juvenile courts may now consider the following factors in
determining if a juvenile may be relieved of registering:
(1) a risk assessment performed by an evaluator approved by the Sex
Offender Management Board; the sex offender history of the adjudicated
juvenile delinquent; (2) evidence of the adjudicated juvenile delinquent's
rehabilitation; (3) the age of the adjudicated juvenile delinquent at the
time of the offense; (4) information related to the adjudicated juvenile
delinquent's mental, physical, educational, and social history; (5)victim
impact statements; and (6) any other factors deemed relevant by the
court.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3-5(e) (West 2008).
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77
juveniles, particularly juveniles under the age of 13."

III.

ANALYSIS

Both Illinois' former and current versions of the SORA would
impose such an unwise burden on J.W. Simply because states can
require juvenile sex offenders to register does not imply that all
juvenile offenders should register. To once again invoke (and
broaden) Justice McMorrow's plea, a state legislature must ensure
that its sex offender registration laws are wise; that it maintains
its goal of public protection while not burdening the juveniles who
should not be unnecessarily labeled as sex offenders. 78 Such a law
must support the policies behind sex offender registration and
juvenile justice. 79 This Section analyzes the wisdom behind sex
offender registration laws, with particular attention to the Illinois
scheme, by examining the policy behind these laws and how they
are administered.
A. BalancingPublic Protectionwith
ProperApplication of Juvenile Justice
An effective sex offender registration law must balance two
policies,80 and this is no simple task. On one side is the need to
protect the public, especially children, from all sex offenders.81 On
the other side is the correct application of juvenile justice to sex
offenders who are themselves juveniles.8 2 The best possible
solution would fully accommodate both strongly-supported
policies.
Certainly, the support for public protection is evident in the
nationwide application of Megan's Law.8 3
Without such
widespread public support, Megan's Law and its state progeny
may not exist.8 4 This support is not unfounded. What happened

77. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (McMorrow, J., concurring). Note that
Justice McMorrow's comment came before Illinois amended its Sex Offender
Registration Act.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 83-84 (recognizing that there is a substantial purpose-public
protection-behind sex offender registration, but, at the same time, it is at
tension with "the philosophical underpinnings of our juvenile justice system").
80. See Wind, supra note 11, at 106 (noting that the sex offender
registration laws protect the public by preventing recidivism, but, as juveniles
may be rehabilitated, there is insufficient justification "to warrant registration
of child sex offenders").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young "Sex
Offenders" How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should
Inform Daily Practice,79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 501 (2006).
84. See Sarah W. Craun & Poco D. Kernsmith, Juvenile Offenders and Sex
Offender Registries: Examining the Data Behind the Debate, 70 FED.
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to Megan Kanka was unconscionable.8 5 It is hardly bad policy to
protect children, who are naturally vulnerable, from becoming
86
victims like Megan.
At the same time, the core of this policy-that children are
more vulnerable than adults-cannot be ignored in other contexts.
For this very reason, states long ago separated juvenile courts
from adult courts.8 7 Children are different from adults and should
not always be punished in the same manner.8 8 Again, a central
policy of juvenile justice, while somewhat eroded, is to rehabilitate
juveniles.8 9 In other words, juvenile justice systems aim to
prevent juveniles from becoming recidivists.
Sex offender
registration, in theory, protects the children because it puts them
and their parents on notice of potential recidivists. As both
policies share an interest in preventing recidivism, there is no
reason both policies cannot work together.
State legislatures, however, must make an effort to
accommodate both policies. 90 In this context, the laws must be
tailored to both protect children from dangerous sex offenders and
protect juveniles from not being unnecessarily subjected to
registration. 91

B.

Recidivism

Both policies share the goal of preventing recidivism, but the
role registration plays in preventing recidivism is not immediately
clear. The impetus for sex offender registration is protecting
children from sex offenders; the underlying reason for registration
is that it will prevent recidivism. 92 The central premise of sex
offender law is that sex offenders are more likely to be repeat
PROBATION 45, 45 (2006) (citing that eight out of ten people surveyed in
Washington State considered Megan's Law "very important"); see also 142
CONG. REC. 10,354 (1996) (showing that the House of Representatives passed
the community notification element of Megan's Law-the amendment then
know as Megan's Law-with a unanimous 418 to 0 vote).
85. Wind, supra note 11, at 90.
86. See Filler, supra note 28, at 342 (noting that the primary purpose of
Megan's Law is to protect children who, like Megan Kanka, are unable to
protect themselves).
87. McNaughton, supra note 49, at 1063.
88. Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing. A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex
Offenders, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 379, 400 (2005).
89. Id.
90. See Adam Shajnfield & Richard B. Krueger, Reforming (Purportedly)
Non-Punitive Responses to Sexual Offending, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81,

96 (2006) (noting that sex offender registration must be preceded by careful
study and must be based on "sound science or public policy").
91. Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, at 514.
92. Poritz, 142 662 A.2d at 404; see also In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 758
(holding that the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act was intended to
protect the public from sex offenders).
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offenders than other types of criminals. 93 Therefore, registration
allows the public access to the offender's location so that the
offender may be avoided. 94 In other words, a sex offender is
punished by their criminal sentence 95 and is, in theory, prevented
96
from re-offending by having to register as a sex offender.
Whether sex offenders are more likely recidivists has been
debated since Congress passed Megan's Law. 97 It is also pertinent
to consider if juvenile sex offenders are more likely recidivists than
adults. 98 Opponents of Megan's Law contend that there is no proof
that sex offenders are likely recidivists, a claim supported by the
absence of any study confirming the recidivism rates for sex
offenders. 99 Not surprisingly, proponents of Megan's Law also cite
the dearth of numerical support, but note that their theory cannot
be dismissed without support100

93. See 142 CONG. REC. H4451-02 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Molinari) (discussing that sex offenders recidivism rates are high and
noting that this rate has been demonstrated "time and time again").
94. Filler, supra note 28, at 340-41; see, e.g., Illinois Sex Offender
Information database, http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/ (last visited on Nov. 11,
2008) (listing registered sex offenders and their registered information).
Interestingly, the front page to the site notes that the "information contained
on this site does not imply listed individuals will commit a specific type of
crime in the future, nor does it imply that if a future crime is committed by a
listed individual what the nature of that crime may be." Id.
95. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5) (West 2008) (requiring
that a juvenile must first be adjudicated delinquent of committing a criminal
act before registration applies).
96. Filler, supra note 28, at 340.
97. See generally Garfinkle, supra note 14, at 171 (discussing that
legislators have long supported the claim that sex offenders are recidivists and
that this belief, though unsupported, led to the passage of Megan's Law); see
also Joanna C. Enstice, Remembering the Victims of Sexual Abuse: The
Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offenders in In Re J.W, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 941,
997-998 (2004) (discussing the inconclusive data that proponents of Megan's
Law used to support the theory that juvenile sex offenders will become repeat
offenders).
98. See generally Caballero, supra note 88, at 397-400 (discussing that sex
offender registration laws are based on the theory that sex offenders are likely
recidivists, but, at the very least, conclusive results on juvenile recidivism
rates are needed before requiring juveniles to also register as sex offenders).
99. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3421-01 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement
of S. Gramm) (explaining that sexual predators have a recidivism rate higher
than any other type of criminal, and, in fact are ten times more likely to
commit another sex offense than an armed robber will commit armed robbery
again); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 55, at 25 (noting that state
and federal legislators are largely responsible for perpetuating the theory that
sex offender recidivism rates are high, yet these legislators "rarely cite ... the
source and credibility of such figures").
100. Caballero, supra note 88, at 397; see also Garfinkle, supra note 14, at
172 (noting that despite conclusive numbers on exactly how many sex
offenders re-offend, it is clear that most sex offenders are not recidivists).
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The findings are inconsistent, and ultimately, not conclusive,
but do point to sex offender recidivism rates that are lower than
legislators cited when passing the laws. 10 1 With this in mind,
juveniles may be slightly more likely recidivists than adults. 102
Nonetheless, the rates are not nearly as high as legislators
1 03
believed, but they are not so low as to be ignored.
Perhaps the most important finding of these studies is that
the most likely victim of a juvenile sex offender is a juvenile. 10 4
The average victim age of a juvenile sex offender is fifteen, while
the typical victim of an adult offender is thirty-three.105 If
protecting children from sex offenders is the true purpose of
Megan's Law, then this finding supports applying sex offender
registration to juveniles.
While this finding does support extending registration
requirements to juveniles, it does not obviate legislatures from
tailoring their laws so that they do not automatically include all
juvenile offenders. 10 6 As will be discussed below, some juveniles
are not dangerous and should not be forced to register.107
C.

Mechanisms

The goal, and, to a certain extent, the policy behind Megan's
Law is too strongly supported to be ignored. At the same time,
registration laws must not unnecessarily require all juvenile
offenders to register. Simply by virtue of being labeled a sex
offender and registrant, a juvenile receives a black mark on his
name. 08 Yet not all juvenile offenders are dangerous or even
101. See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 55, 25-30 (concluding
that it is difficult to accurately measure sex offender recidivism rates, but it is
clear from numerous reports that the recidivism rates are lower than the
figure legislators cited in supporting Megan's Law).
102. Craun & Kernsmith, supra note 84, at 47. This study found that eightyeight percent of convicted adults sex offenders committed only one offense but
only eighty-four percent of juveniles committed one offense. Id. While this is
not a vast disparity, Craun and Kernsmith noted their surprise that more
juveniles had re-offended because "older offenders would have more years to
offend." Id.
103. Tom Leversee & Christy Pearson, Eliminating the Pendulum Effect: A
Balanced Approach to the Assessment, Treatment, and Management of
Sexually Abusive Youth, 3 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 45, 49
(2001). Recidivism rates for sex offenders range from eight to thirty-seven
percent, but ten percent "is believed to be the typical recidivism rate for
sexually abusive youths." Id.
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id.
106. Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing
Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J.
1111, 1112 (2006).
107. See infra Part III(C)(1) (discussing circumstances under which juvenile
sex offenders should not be required to register).
108. Shajnfield & Krueger, supra note 90, at 82. Not only does requiring sex
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potential recidivists. 10 9 Registration laws can better incorporate
this distinction by modifying registration parameters, such as
when registration is triggered and how registration is
terminated. 11 0
1.

TriggeringRegistration

The most prominent problem with applying sex offender
registration laws to juveniles is that some juveniles who may not
be dangerous or potential recidivists are forced to register. 1 1 This
situation puts a black mark on those juveniles while not protecting
the public. 11 2 In fact, it may even hurt the public-if the juvenile
is no risk, state money is essentially wasted in making the juvenile
register.

113

a.

Distinguishing Between Types of Juvenile
Offenders

Consider a sixteen-year-old couple. Perhaps at some point
their relationship progresses to the point that one or both minors
remove some of their clothing in order to arouse their partner.
This is not dangerous, deviant or even unusual behavior for
sixteen-year-olds. Nonetheless, if any parent were to find out
about the incident and, in their anger, file criminal charges, either
1 14
If
minor could be guilty of sexual exploitation of a child.
be
also
would
the
minor
Illinois,
in
delinquent
adjudicated
11 5
subjected to at least a ten year registration as a sex offender.
While the preceding example may not end in adjudication for
the juvenile, it does represent a sex offense and subsequent

offender registration force the label of sex offender on the registrant, the
registration requirement turns them into social outcasts. Id.
109. Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, at 502.
110. See generally Pamela S. Richardson, Mandatory Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification: the Only Viable Option to Protect
All the Nation's Children, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 237, 255-60 (2002) (discussing
the methods different states utilize in initializing and ending sex offender
registration for juvenile offenders).
111. See generally Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, at 505-7 (discussing how
many juvenile sex offenders are simply curious about their sexuality and their
"crimes" are the result of sexual exploration). Some punishment and guidance
are more than enough to deter future incidents. Id. at 506.
112. See generally Earl-Hubbard, supra note 16, at 796 (discussing how a sex
offender registry gives law enforcement officials a list of possible offenders
when a sex crime is committed by an unknown assailant). If the registrant
poses no threat of future crime, there is no need to track them.
113. Shajnfield & Krueger, supra note 90, at 91.
114. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.1 (a-5) (West 2008). "A person
commits sexual exploitation of a child who knowingly entices, coerces, or
persuades a child to remove the child's clothing for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification of the person or the child, or both." Id.
115. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(B)(1) (West 2008).
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registration that would be administered to a minor most would not
consider dangerous or a likely recidivist. 16 Nonetheless, the new
Illinois SORA would result in that child being labeled a sex
117
offender and registrant.
If this example represents one end of a spectrum of offenses,
it is illuminating to consider an example at the opposite end.
Consider the same sixteen-year-old, but this time he coerces or
forces a seven-year-old into allowing him to penetrate him or her.
In this case, the sixteen-year old committed criminal sexual
assault. 118 Here, the general consensus is that the offender
committed a serious offense and absolutely should be punished as
he very well may be a future danger. 119
These two examples illustrate that not all juvenile sex
offenses are the same. 120 There are offenses that should not be
punished with registration, but at the same time, there are many
that, at the very least, should require registration.'12 Illinois's
SORA ignores this distinction, but not all states do.
For example, Mississippi does not attach registration unless a
juvenile is older than fourteen, 122 and if over fourteen, only if they
are adjudicated delinquent of rape, sexual assault, statutory rape,
or a conspiracy to commit any of these offenses. 23 Further,
126 Connecticut, 127 Colorado, 128
Alabama, 24 Arizona, 25 Arkansas,
116. See Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, at 506 (demonstrating that teens who
act out on their sexual desires are showing immaturity and not signs of
pedophilia); see also McNaughton, supra note 49, at 1073 (discussing that
juvenile sexual experimentation is not deviant behavior and should not be
punished beyond the juvenile sentence with registration as a sex offender).
117. See also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3-5(a) (West 2008).
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2008). "The accused
commits criminal sexual assault if he or she commits an act of sexual
penetration by the use of force or threat of force." Id.
119. Leversee & Pearson, supra note 103, at 46. Of course, it is also
interesting to make one final adjustment to this example. What if the
offender, like J.W., is twelve instead of sixteen?
120. Madeline Carter, Kurt Bumby & Thomas Talbot, Promoting Offender
Accountablity and Community Safety Through the Comprhensive Approach to
Sex Offender Management, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2004); see also
Ayn Embar-Seddon & Allan D. Pass, Assessing, Managing, and Treating
Juvenile Sex Offenders, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 112, 117 (2004) (noting
that there are a great variety of sex offenders, whether juvenile or adult).
121. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence,
Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 814-15 (2005)
(discussing how juveniles have less mature emotional and psychological
development than adults and tend to have lower impulse control in situations
where emotional arousal is high).
122. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(1)(a) (West 2008).
123. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(1)(b) (West 2008).
124. ALA. CODE § 15-20-28(c) (West 2008); see also D.B.Y. v. State, 910 So.
2d 820, 826 (Ala. 2005) (holding that a judge must wait for a sexual-offender
risk assessment before determining whether a juvenile sex offender must
register as a sex offender).
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32
3
allow
Iowa, 129 Massachusetts, 13 0 Montana,' ' and North Dakota
the court to use its discretion in attaching registration to
delinquent juveniles.
However, even these laws are not adequate. According to Ayn
Embar-Seddon and Allan D. Pass, professors at Capella
University, the first step in successfully treating a juvenile sex
offender should be the administration of a well-informed
assessment. 3 3 They point out that although many jurisdictions do
34
For
assess sex offenders, such assessments are poorly done.

125. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(D) (2008). "The court may require a
person who has been adjudicated delinquent for an act that would constitute
an offense specified in subsection A or C of this section to register pursuant to
this section." Id. (emphasis added).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356 (West 2008). When a juvenile sex offender
is adjudicated guilty of a sex offense, the court may order a sex offender
screening assessment, and, once carried out, may, following a motion from the
prosecutor, require the juvenile to register as a sex offender. Id; see also L.W.
v. State, 202 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the trial
judge's decision to require a juvenile to register as a sex offender must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(b) (West 2008). If a sex offender is
under the age of nineteen at the time of the offense, the trial judge may decide
not to impose registration "if it is not required for public safety." Id.; see also
State v. Bletsch, 860 A.2d 299, 303 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that even if
a sex offender is a juvenile-under the age of nineteen-and does not pose a
danger to the public, the trial judge "still retains discretion to determine
whether an exemption is warranted").
128. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-22-103(5)(a) (West 2008). The court may
exempt a juvenile from registering as a sex offender if they find that
registration would be unfairly punitive and that the juvenile does not pose a
significant threat to the public. Id.
129. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2(4) (West 2008); see also In re J.A.C., 723
N.W.2d 450, 450 (Iowa App. 2006) (holding that a juvenile sex offender is
presumed to have to register as a sex offender, but, subject to the judge's
discretion, this presumption may be overcome if the juvenile shows that they
are not abusive or a risk to the community).
130. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178E(e) (West 2008). While a trial judge
may remove the registration requirement for a juvenile offender, the judge
may only do so after a written motion from the commonwealth. Id.
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1513(2) (West 2008); see also State v.
Villanueva, 118 P.3d 179, 182 (Mont. 2005) (holding that a juvenile,
adjudicated guilty of a sex offense in Washington, still had to register when he
moved to Montana, even though he would not have had to register if originally
adjudicated in Montana).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2)(c) (West 2008).
The court may deviate from requiring the juvenile to register if the court
first finds the juvenile has not previously been convicted as a sexual
offender or for a crime against a child, and the juvenile did not exhibit
mental abnormality or predatory conduct in the commission of the
offense
Id.
133. Embar-Seddon & Allan D. Pass, supra note 120, at 114.
134. Id.
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instance, the assessment is generic-it essentially treats juvenile
and adult offenders equally. 135 Further, judges are generally poor
evaluators of such reports and may not fully understand the
professional analysis. 136 Nonetheless, if a judge does have the
final word, then they should be well informed.
b.

Illinois and J. W.

Interestingly, the court in J. W had multiple professional
analyses at its disposal. First, a psychiatrist testified at J.W.'s
sentencing hearing.1 37 He diagnosed J.W. with paraphila, a
disorder where a person engages in sexual activity that is not
sanctioned by society. 138 The psychiatrist concluded that J.W.
would be a risk to the public if he was not placed in residential
treatment.1 39 Second, the court heard testimony from a therapist
who had ten prior years of experience with juvenile sex
offenders.1 40 She testified that "J.W. was a danger to the
community to a certain degree," and recommended that J.W.
4
receive specialized treatment.' '
After hearing these experts' testimony, the trial court
sentenced J.W. to five years probation. 142 In light of J.W.'s action,
this punishment, along with the court supervision that
accompanies probation, was reasonable. Sex offender registration
automatically attached, regardless of whether the court "found"
registration necessary. 143 The expert witnesses spoke about
treatment, the court listened, but the court was unable to consider
whether J.W. should register as a sex offender. What purpose did
the expert testimony at the sentencing hearing serve?
Of course, there is no completely accurate method to
determine if a juvenile sex offender is a recidivist, but there are
better ways than Illinois essentially per se law. 44 Without
change, even Illinois' new SORA will force juveniles to register as
sex offenders even if they should not be required to do so.

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. InreJ.W., 787 N.E.2d at 751.
138. Id. This diagnosis begs the question: Does society sanction any sexual
activity by twelve year old children? Also, the psychiatrist noted that the
diagnosis would have been pedophilia if J.W. had been sixteen. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 752. This therapist had also worked with J.W. on a weekly basis
for at least one year.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 753.
143. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5) (West 2008).

144. See generally Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, 505-06 (discussing how
medical research and common sense are paramount in assessing when and if
subjecting juveniles to registration is appropriate).
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TerminatingRegistration

On the other hand, the recently amended Illinois law does
contain a mechanism to release rehabilitated juveniles. 145
A
juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be able to petition the court to
release him/her from registering after five years. 146 This part of
the legislation is a step forward' 47 as it not only recognizes the old
hallmark of juvenile justice, rehabilitation, but it allows a
148
potentially dangerous juvenile the chance to recover.
This type of mechanism, however, still does not aid juveniles
9
that should not have been forced to register in the first place.14
The damage is already done. 150 They were already labeled as a
5
sexual deviant and registrant, as well as a delinquent.' '
Again, J.W. exemplifies how his approach is deficient. J.W.
committed aggravated criminal sexual assault.1 52 However, his
case was different from the above examples: J.W. was only
twelve. 53 There is absolutely no question that his act was
culpable. 15 4 J.W. deserved punishment, and the juvenile justice
system levied his punishment.1 55 Certainly Illinois' new scheme
will recognize when, and if, J.W. is rehabilitated, but it will not
recognize whether J.W. should have been forced to register in the
145. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3-5(d) (West 2008).
146. 730 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 150/3-5(c) (West 2008).
147. See Generally Michael L. Skoglund, Private Threats, Public Stigma?
Avoiding False Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the Juvenile
Justice System, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1805, 1833 (2000) (noting that no juvenile
previously adjudicated delinquent should be released back into the public if
they are a risk to the community, but public safety is increased by releasing
fully rehabilitated juvenile offenders).
148. See Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth
Participation in Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized
Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 466, 471 (2007) (noting that
collateral consequences such as sex offender registration seriously limit "the
life chances of youth"); see also Shajnfeld & Krueger, supra note 90, at 82
(discussing that registration is a punitive sanction that not only may increase
sex offending but also prevents effective treatment as leaves no incentive for
the registrant to, in essence, work towards rehabilitation).
149. See id. at 84 (demonstrating that many juvenile sex offenders are
unlikely to re-offend and forcing them to register serves no purpose as it does
nothing to further public protection).
150. See Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic
Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 358-59 (2005)
(discussing how sex offender registration shames the registrant due to the
discomfort they feel from their past actions being revealed to the public).
151. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5) (West 2008) (requiring
a juvenile to first be adjudicated delinquent before sex offender registration
must attach).
152. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 751.
153. Id.
154. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-701 (West 2008) (creating the
punitive sentences that may be given to juveniles adjudicated delinquent).
155. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[42:187

first place. As such, the new Illinois law is still unwise.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The problem with the new Illinois registration law is glaring:
it lacks a mechanism to allow the courts to use their discretion in
determining if a juvenile should be required to register as a sex
offender. 156 A remedy is not only apparent but is simple to
implement. Illinois should sever the juvenile requirement from
SORA and move it under the umbrella of the Juvenile Act as a
sentence the court could impose on a juvenile.
A.

Why This is Apparent and Simple to Implement

As discussed above, registration is inappropriate for some
juvenile sex offenders. 157 Certainly it is not possible to predict
with complete accuracy how a juvenile will respond to treatment,
or if the juvenile may be rehabilitated at all. 58 It is, however,
unreasonable that Illinois juvenile courts may hear professional
opinions on such matters but cannot use it to determine if a
juvenile should register as a sex offender. 5 9 Yet, it would not
require great effort to change Illinois' law to eradicate this
problem.
The Juvenile Act already places the necessary tools at the
courts' fingertips. Once a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, the
trial judge has wide discretion over the sentence to impose on the
juvenile. 160 At the sentencing hearing, the court must determine

156. See supra Part III(C)(1)(a) (arguing that sex offender registration laws
that lack a filter mechanism unfairly treat all juvenile offenders the same,
even though many juveniles and juvenile sex crimes are not equal).
157. See Carter, Bumby, & Talbot, supra note 120, at 1286 (arguing that the
diversity of sex offenders necessitates a flexible approach, and that the generic
"one size fits all approach" is inappropriate); Embar-Seddon & Pass, supra
note 120, at 117 (explaining how a "spectrum of treatments" is absolutely
necessary in order to adequately comprehend and treat the "spectrum" of sex
offenses and offenders); see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 812-17
(discussing how bright-line age tests for distinguishing juveniles from adults is
ineffective and how a case-by-case analysis of neurological, intellectual,
emotional, and psychosocial development more precisely measures maturity);
supra Part III(C)(1)(a) (demonstrating how a juvenile's age and the type of sex
crime committed not only drastically change the nature of the sex crime
committed but also affect how much of a danger the accused is to the public).
158. Embar-Seddon & Pass, supra note 120, at 115; see also Skoglund, supra
note 147, at 1824 (treating juveniles is still a developing science, and, while
improvement is noticeable, treatment models are still not completely
successful).
159. See Meiners-Levy, supra note 83, at 514 (arguing that sex crime
statutes must be crafted to distinguish between predatory and non-predatory
juvenile offenses, but until they do "defense counsel must play a decisive and
aggressive role in pushing legal change").
160. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-705(1) (West 2008); see also 705 ILL.
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the "proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and
162
the public."' 16 1 The court may, for instance, impose probation,
163
placement in a detention center,
or submission to medical
treatment. 64 Adding registration as a sex offender to this list of
sentences would properly bring registration under the court's
control.
More importantly, the Juvenile Act already includes methods
for the court to determine if a juvenile adjudicated delinquent
should be required to register. The Juvenile Act requires any
juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense to undergo a sex
offender evaluation performed by a certified evaluator. 165 This
requirement gives the court automatic access to the information it
needs to evaluate the need for registration. Further, the court
may admit "[a]ll evidence helpful in determining" the sentence
66
that best serves the juvenile's and the public's interests.
The court must already hear expert testimony describing the
likelihood that treatment will help a juvenile, and, indirectly, the
public interest. Likewise, the court has wide discretion to impose
what it believes is the best mix of sentencing to properly serve
both interests.
B.

What This Approach Would Have Meant for J. W.

The J.W. court heard testimony from both a psychiatrist and
a therapist. 67 The psychiatrist determined that J.W. would pose a
threat to the community if he was not treated. 68 Similarly, the
therapist concluded that J.W., while at the time a risk to the
community, was likely to respond favorably to treatment, and, in
fact, should not be relegated to a residential facility and should be
69
allowed to remain in the community.
Certainly balancing J.W.'s interests with the public's interest
was not an easy task. Yet, the court essentially had no choice but
to disregard the expert testimony and automatically subject J.W.,
a twelve year-old boy, to registration as a sex offender. The court
never had the opportunity to balance these interests as it had no
control over registration during the sentencing phase of J.W.'s

COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710 (West 2008) (listing the types of sentences the
trial judge "may" impose on the juvenile).
161. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710 (West 2008).
162. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710(1)(a)(i) (West 2008).
163. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710(1)(a)(v) (West 2008).
164. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710(1)(a)(ix) (West 2008).
165. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-701 (West 2008).

Specifically, the

evaluator must be approved by the Sex Offender Management Board and the
standards it propagates under the Sex Offender Management Board Act. Id.
166. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-705(1) (West 2008).

167. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 750-52.
168. Id. at 752.
169. Id. at 753.
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trial.
Illinois needs to allow the juvenile courts to exercise their
discretion, as they do in other phases of sentencing, in order to
determine if a juvenile must register as a sex offender. The
Juvenile Act already gives the courts the tools they need to make
this decision. All that remains is for the legislature to allow the
courts to fully utilize these tools by severing the registration
requirements for juveniles from the SORA and placing it within
the Juvenile Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Megan's Law is undoubtedly here to stay. All fifty states
have adopted some form of sex offender registration law, and most
apply that registration to juveniles. These laws have survived
numerous challenges and changes, but it is clear that they may be
imposed on juveniles. It is not so clear, however, that they should
always be imposed on juveniles.
Juvenile sex offenders may be dangerous, potential recidivists
that pose a significant risk to the children Megan's Law aims to
protect. Some, however, are not dangerous. A wise sex offender
registration law must recognize this distinction. Illinois' new
SORA lacks such a distinction despite the ease with which it could
be fixed by bringing juvenile registration within the Juvenile Act.

